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ݔ௜௝
in the global supply chain planning. Esmaeili and 
Zeephongsekul [7] introduce a seller-buyer supply chain 
model with an asymmetric information structure. They 
assume that only buyer knows the demand function and is 
aware of the seller’s setup cost and purchasing cost. Lei et al. 
[8] investigates the impact of asymmetric information on 
disruption management when disruptions of demand and costs 
are private information. Most of works related to asymmetric 
information by applying game theory assume that demand 
information is asymmetric. There are rarely researches 
considering asymmetric quality information by applying game 
theoretic approaches. Tse and Tan [9] study the unclear 
information of quality risk and visibility in a multi-tier supply 
chain. They consider the situation of asymmetric information 
between a manufacturer and a supplier. They focus on the 
manufacturer’s decision making to manage risk and visibility 
in supply chain planning. The coordination between the 
manufacturers and the supplier is not investigated. A game 
theoretic model for single manufacturer and suppliers has 
been presented by Yin et al. [10]. However, the supplier 
selection and the coordination with retailers have not been 
studied in the conventional works. 
The objective of this paper is to study a three echelon 
supply chain model with the supplier selection and 
asymmetric quality information under demand uncertainty. 
The problem is solved by a game theoretical approach. It is 
assumed that the quality information between the 
manufacturer and suppliers is asymmetric. Thus, a worst case 
and an average case are analyzed to estimate uncertainty due 
to asymmetric information. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The problem 
description and modeling are described in Section 2. The 
solution approach is provided in Section 3. Numerical 
examples are shown in Section 4. Finally, the concluding 
remarks are stated in Section 5 with the future work. 
2. Problem description 
2.1. The three echelon supply chain 
The outline of the supply chain model is shown in Fig. 1.  
Fig. 1. The supply chain model. 
In our model, a hierarchical supply chain consisting of one 
manufacturer which produces finished product ݇ሺ݇ ൌ
ͳǡǥ ǡ ܭሻ , suppliers ݆ሺ݆ ൌ ͳǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܬሻ  as followers producing 
component ݅ሺ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ܫሻ, and a retailer is addressed. In order 
to satisfy uncertain demands, the retailer orders finished 
products from the manufacturer. The manufacturer and the 
retailer are coordinated by buyback contracts. The retailer 
decides order quantities of finished products under demand 
uncertainty. The asymmetric quality information is considered 
between one manufacturer and suppliers in the paper. The 
manufacturer decides production and the selection of 
suppliers. Quality of components and quantity of components 
are determined by suppliers. The problem is formulated by a 
Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and 
both of the suppliers and the retailer are the followers. 
2.2. Quality 
Suppliers pay higher cost for producing one component if 
the reliability of the component increases. Thus, the 
production cost for one unit component ݅  for supplier ݆
depends on the reliability ݔ௜௝  and the order quantity ݀௜௝  of 
component ݅  for supplier ݆ . The number of defective 
components is affected by reliability ݔ௜௝. If the reliability ݔ௜௝
increases, the number of defective components decreases. The 
production cost is expressed by the cost function ݄௜௝, such as 
݄௜௝ ൌ ܣ௜௝ ൅ ܤ௜௝݀௜௝ ൅ ܥ௜௝ݔ௜௝. ܣ௜௝ is the fixed cost of production 
for one unit component ݅  paid by supplier ݆ . ܤ௜௝  is the 
production cost responsiveness to the quantity of component ݅
for supplier ݆ . It indicates that if the order quantity ݀௜௝  is 
increased, production cost per one unit component increases. 
The increase of the order quantity of components causes the 
increase of production for the supplier. Thus, the supplier 
must pay more production costs such as machinery wearout 
costs or labor costs. ܥ௜௝ is the production cost responsiveness 
to the reliability of component ݅ for supplier ݆. It indicates that 
higher reliability drives the increase of the production cost. It 
is assumed that the number of defective component ݅  for 
supplier ݆ is normally distributed where ߤ௜௝ is mean value of 
number of defective component ݅  for supplier, which is a 
constant known by both of the manufacturer and suppliers. 
However, the standard deviation of number of defective 
components ߜ௜௝  is a decision variable for suppliers which is 
unknown for the manufacturer. With the increase of the 
standard deviation ߜ௜௝ , the reliability of components will 
decrease. Therefore, there is an assumption in our paper such 




మ . The higher ߜ௜௝  reduces the 
reliability of components seen in Fig. 2. The negative sign of 
this assumption is that it becomes difficult to evaluate the 
quality of components if ߜ௜௝ is large, because ݔ௜௝ tend to close 
to zero if ߜ௜௝ becomes large.  
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2.3. Formulation 
Indices  
݅ : component for assembling finished products ሺ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܫሻ
݆ǣሺ݆ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܬሻ
݇ : product ሺ݇ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܭሻ
Decision variables 
Retailer: 
ܦ௞: order quantity of finished product ݇ from the retailer 
Manufacturer: 
ݕ௞ : production quantity of finished product ݇  from the 
manufacturer for the retailer  
௜ܲ௝: estimated quantity of defective component ݅ from supplier
݆
ݒ௜௝ : binary variable which takes 1 if the manufacturer buys 
component ݅ from supplier ݆
ݓ௝: binary variable to determine the selection of suppliers ݆
for actual purchase which takes 1 if supplier ݆ is contracted, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Supplier ݅:
݀௜௝: order quantity of component ݅offered by supplier ݆ to the 
manufacturer 
ߜ௜௝: standard deviation of the reliability of production system 
to produce component ݅ for supplier ݆
ݔ௜௝: reliability of component ݅ for supplier ݆
Parameters 
Retailer: 
ݖ௞ଵ: credit cost per unit paid by the manufacturer to the retailer 
for returned product ݇
ݖ௞ଶ : goodwill penalty cost per one unit product ݇  due to 
stockout incurred by the retailer 
݌௞: selling price of finished product ݇ by the retailer 
ܦ௞ᇱ : random variable of demand of finished products from 
customers which follows a normal distribution such that 
ܦ௞ᇱ̱ܰሺݑ௞ᇱᇱǡ ߜ௞ᇱᇱଶሻ where ݑ௞ᇱᇱ is the given mean value and ߜ௞ᇱᇱ is 
the given standard deviation 
݂ሺܦ௞ᇱ ሻ: probability density function followed by the demand 
of product ݇ for the retailer  
Manufacturer: 
௜ܷ௝ : upper bound of estimation of the worst case for 
component ݅ for supplier ݆
ݎ௞: wholesale price of finished product ݇ from the retailer  
ݖ௞ଷ : inventory cost per one unit product ݇  from the retailer 
paid by the manufacturer 
ݎ௞: wholesale price of finished product ݇
݁௞: unit production cost for product ݇ offering to retailer  
ܽ௞ : opportunity loss cost for understocking of one unit of 
product ݇
ܾ௞ : inventory holding cost for overstocking of one unit of 
product ݇
௝ܿ: the capacity of supplier ݆
݂ሺݖ௞ሻ: probability density function followed by the demand of 
the product ݇
݊௜௝: the internal resource of component ݅ for supplier ݆
߬௜௝: penalty cost for extra defective component ݅ for supplier ݆
ߚ௜௝ : cost of extra required component  purchased from the 
spot market  
௜݃௞: number of units of component   required to produce one 
unit of product ݇
ݐ௞: resource required by the manufacturer to produce one unit 
of product ݇
ܳ: production capacity of the manufacturer 
ܴ݁௜௝ : random variable of  realized quantity of defective 
component ݅  for supplier ݆  follows a normal distribution 
where is ߤ௜௝  is the mean value and ߜ௜௝  is the standard 
deviation. Here, ߤ௜௝ is constant 
ݖ௞ : random variable of demand for product ݇  from the 
customers following by a normal distribution  
Supplier: 
݄௜௝: production cost for one unit component ݅ paid by supplier 
݆
ݍ௜௝: selling price of component ݅ for supplier ݆
ߛ௜௝: compensation cost of defective component ݅ paid to the 
manufacturer by supplier ݆
ܣ௜௝: fixed production cost for one unit component ݅ paid by 
supplier ݆
ܤ௜௝ : production cost responsiveness to order quantity of 
component ݅ paid by supplier ݆
ܥ௜௝ : production cost responsiveness to risk degree of  
component ݅ paid by supplier ݆
Due to asymmetric quality information, the manufacturer 
cannot observe full information of defective components 
during the negotiation process. Therefore, two scenarios 
(average case and worst case) for the manufacturer are 
investigated to estimate the number of defective components. 
For the average case, two situations are considered by the 
manufacturer. The number of defective components is 
estimated by minimizing the total expected penalty cost. For 
the worst case, the upper bound of defined situation is given. 
2.4. The average case model 
Due to incomplete information, the manufacturer faces 
amount of defective components after delivery from suppliers. 
Thus, the manufacturer should estimate the quantity of 
defective components beforehand. For the average case, once 
the estimated quantity of defective components is less than the 
realized quantity, the manufacturer has to order extra 
components from the outsourcing suppliers in order to 
achieve production. The manufacturer pays penalty costs 
when the estimated quantity is more than the realized quantity. 
However, the manufacturer is compensated by suppliers 
because of amount of defective components. 
2.4.1 Manufacturer’s model with supplier selection 
The manufacturer decides production and supplier 
selection. Due to incomplete information, the manufacturer 
faces amount of defective components after delivery from 
suppliers. Thus, the manufacturer should estimate the quantity 
of defective components beforehand. Let ௜ܲ௝  denote the 
estimated quantity of defective components and ܴ݁௜௝ be a 
random variable of the realized quantity of defective 
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components. It is assumed that the manufacturer knows partial 
quality information of components. Therefore, the realized 
quantity of defective component ܴ݁௜௝  follows a normal 
distributionሺߤ௜௝ǡ ߜ௜௝ଶ ሻ which is known by the manufacturer. 
The manufacturer’s objective function for the average case 
is the maximization of the total profit including the sale 
revenue of finished products, inventory cost, credit cost, 
production cost and purchasing cost of components. The last 
two terms represent the penalty cost caused by defective 
components and the compensation cost paid by suppliers. The 
formulation is as follows: 
σ ሾݎ௞ܦ௞௄௞ୀଵ െ ݖ௞ଷ ሺͲǡ ݕ௞ െ ܦ௞ሻ െ ׬ ሺܦ௞ െ
஽ೖ
଴
















௜ୀଵ       
ሼൣ൫Ͳǡ ܴ݁௜௝ െ ௜ܲ௝൯൧ ൅ ܧሾ൫Ͳǡ ௜ܲ௝ െ ܴ݁௜௝൯ሿሽ           (1)                                                                                         
Subject to: 
1) Production capacity 
σ ݐ௞ݕ௞ ൑ ܳ௄௞ୀଵ                                                                    (2)                                                                           
2) Required amount of components to assemble products 




௞ୀଵ ǡ ׊݅                             (3)                                                                                                                   
3) Supplier’s resource 
σ ݊௜௝ூ௜ୀଵ ݀௜௝ ൑ ௝ܿݓ௝ǡ ׊݆                                                       (4)                                                                                                                    
4) Binary variable constraint 
ݓ௝ ൒ ݒ௜௝ǡ ׊݅ǡ ݆                                                                     (5) 
where ܧ is the expectation of the equation.                                                                                                                
2.4.2 Retailer’s model 
The retailer determines order quantity ܦ௞  from the 
manufacturer with uncertain demands. The demand of 
products from customers is uncertain but it is assumed that 
probability density function ݂ሺܦ௞ᇱ ሻ is known. The retailer and 
the manufacturer are coordinated by the buyback contract. 
Thus, once the demand is realized, retailers could return 
unsold products to the manufacturer. Therefore, the retailer’s 
decision model is formulated as the following unconstrained 
optimization problem: 





׬ ሾ݌௞ܦ௞ െ ሺܦ௞ᇱ െ ܦ௞ሻݖ௞ଶሿ݂ሺܦ௞ᇱ ሻ݀ܦ௞ᇱ െ ܦ௞ݎ௞
ஶ
஽ೖ
ሽ                      (6) 
2.4.3 Suppliers’ model 
The supplier ݆ ’s problem is formulated including sales 
revenue, the cost of components and the penalty cost for 
defective components. 
σ ሼ݀௜௝ூ௜ୀଵ ൫ݍ௜௝ െ ݄௜௝൯ െ ߛ௜௝ሼܧൣ൫Ͳǡ ܴ݁௜௝ െ ௜ܲ௝൯൧ ൅
ܧൣ൫Ͳǡ ௜ܲ௝ െ ܴ݁௜௝൯൧ሽሽ                                                        (7)                 
where 





మ                                                                             (9)
Eq. (8) represents the production cost which depends on the 
quantity of components and the quality of components. Eq. 
(9) is the reliability function with respect to the standard 
deviation of the number of defective components.  
2.5. The worst case model 
The worst case is also considered in this paper so that the 
manufacturer could make pessimistic decisions according to 
his business strategies. Due to different business strategies, 
the definition of the worst case varies. In this paper, it is 
assumed that the worst case is that the actual quantity of 
defective components ܴ݁௜௝ is much larger than the estimated 
number of defective component ௜ܲ௝ . In other words, ܴ݁௜௝ ൐
௜ܲ௝. From the practical perspective, the manufacturers always 
suffer more loss once they have to purchase extra components 
from the spot markets. The manufacturer should determine an 
upper bound of this situation in order to design optimal 
production planning. Therefore, a chance constraint is utilized 
to estimate uncertainty of defective components. The chance 
constraint in this paper is to give an upper bound when the 
production cannot be completely achieved. The additional 
constraint for the manufacturer is given to estimate worst case 
which is expressed by 
ܲݎሾܴ݁௜௝ ൒ ௜ܲ௝ሿ ൑ ௜ܷ௝                         (10) 
where ௜ܷ௝ is the upper bound on the probability  which is 
decided by decision makers. The chance-constraint is given to 
estimate the probability of worse situations that the realized 
quantity of defective components is greater than estimation, 
and the probability is bounded by ௜ܷ௝.   
In order to facilitate the calculation of chance-constraint, 
the equation is reformulated into a form introduced by Petkov 
and Maranas [11]. The chance-constraint is equivalently 
written as  
Ȱ൫୧୨൯ ൒ ͳ െ ௜ܷ௝                               (11)          
where the left-hand side Ȱ൫୧୨൯  is a normal cumulative 
distribution function followed by ሺߤ௜௝ǡ ߜ௜௝ଶ ሻ. The cumulative 




 where ߤ௜௝  is mean value of ܴ݁௜௝and ߜ௜௝  is 
deviation of ܴ݁௜௝.
Thus, ௜ܻ௝ ൒ Ȱିଵሺͳ െ ௜ܷ௝ሻ which is equivalent to  
ߜ௜௝Ȱିଵ൫ͳ െ ௜ܷ௝൯ െ ௜ܲ௝ ൅ ߤ௜௝ ൑ Ͳ              (12)         
The formulation for the worst case is considered by 
embedding the chance-constraint of Eq. (1) into the function 
for the average case.  
3. Solution approach 
The manufacturer and suppliers are analyzed by a 
Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is a leader. The 
optimal response functions should be derived firstly. Then, 
the manufacturer’s decision is solved by substituting optimal 
response functions as input parameters. The supplier ݆ ’s
objective function is rewritten as: 





ߛ௜௝ሼܧൣ൫Ͳǡ ܴ݁௜௝ െ ௜ܲ௝൯൧ ൅ ܧൣ൫Ͳǡ ௜ܲ௝ െ ܴ݁௜௝൯൧ሽ        (13)      
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where ܴ݁௜௝̱ܰሺߤ௜௝ǡ ߜ௜௝ଶ ሻ
The objective function can be reformulated by a 
normalization technique (Petkov and Maranas, 1997). The 




  and  ௜ܻ௝ ൌ
௉೔ೕିఓ೔ೕ
ఋ೔ೕ






ሿ ൅ ሺͳ െ






൨                                                    
ൌ ߜ௜௝ ൅ ߜ௜௝ሼܨ൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ܧൣ ௜ܺ௝ห ௜ܺ௝ ൑ ௜ܻ௝൧ ൅ ሺͳ െ
ܨ൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ሻܧൣ ௜ܺ௝ห ௜ܺ௝ ൑ ௜ܻ௝൧                                                                                                        
ܧൣ ௜ܻ௝ห ௜ܻ௝ ൑ ௜ܺ௝൧ ൌ ௜ܻ௝                                                                                                                              




















Thus, the resulting formulation is obtained as follows: 





ߛ௜௝ߜ௜௝ሾʹ݂൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ െ ௜ܻ௝ ൅ ʹ ௜ܻ௝ܨ൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ሿሽ                                    (14)                                                 




, ܨ൫ ௜ܻ௝൯  is a cumulative distribution 
function, and ݂൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ is a probability density function.                                                                                                                         
The following optimal response functions are calculated by 





















൫െ ௜ܻ௝൯ כ ൬െ
௉೔ೕିఓ೔ೕ
ఋ೔ೕ








మ ߜ௜௝ െ ʹߛ௜௝݂൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ െ ʹߛ௜௝݂൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ ௜ܻ௝ଶ ൅




మ ߜ௜௝ െ ʹߛ௜௝݂൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ሿ         (15)                               
By solving the equation 
ப௅భ
பఋ೔ೕ
ൌ Ͳ, the critical point of the 
equation as an increasing and concave function of ߜ௜௝  is 

























݂൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ ௜ܻ௝ଶሿ ൑ Ͳ   
                                                                                                                    




By taking the first derivative of ܮଵ with respect to ݀௜௝ and 
setting the result to zero as follows: 
డ௅భ
డௗ೔ೕ




మ ሻ ൌ Ͳ              (16) 




మ ൌ െσ ʹܤ௜௝ூ௜ୀଵ ൑ Ͳ . 
The retailer’s best response function is obtained 
analytically. The retailer’s objective function is expressed by:  





׬ ݌௞ܦ௞ െ ሺܦ௞ᇱ െ ܦ௞ሻݖ௞ଶሿ݂ሺܦ௞ᇱ ሻ݀ܦ௞ᇱ െ ܦ௞ݎ௞
ஶ
஽ೖ
ሽ                (17) 
In order to determine the optimal order quantity ܦ௞כ, the 
following equations are obtained by differentiating Eq. (17) 
with respect to the order quantity ܦ௞ and set this amount equal 
to 0:  
డ௅మ
డ஽ೖ






మ                                                            (18) 
         
This is a global maximum, since from Eq. (6) 
డమ௅మ
డ஽ೖ
మ ൌ െ݂ሺܦ௞כሻሺ݌௞ ൅ ݖ௞ଶ െ ݖ௞ଵሻ ൑ Ͳ                                 (19) 
4. Computational examples 
In this section, the modeling approach is applied in an 
illustrative case study. There are assumed to be three 
outsourcing suppliers ( ܬ ൌ ͵ ) which offers four electronic 
parts ( ܫ ൌ Ͷ ). The manufacturer assembles two types of 
electronic devices ሺܭ ൌ ʹ) to sell to the market. The demand 
of finished products from customers is assumed to follow a 
normal distribution with mean value of 13 for each type of 
products and standard deviation of 19 and 18, respectively. 
Since profit monotonically increases with the decrease of ௜ܷ௝,
the discussion on the selection of parameter Ƚ is neglected. A 
relatively much small value compared with the possibility 
when the actual quantity of defective components is large than 
the estimated defective components for the average case is 
chosen. Thus, the upper bound of worst case ௜ܷ௝ is set to 0.54. 
The unit sales revenue for each product is 2000, and 
production cost for each product is 10. The opportunity loss 
cost for each product is 200, and the inventory cost for each 
product is 80 and 100, respectively. Other parameters are 
shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Parameters for computational experiments. 
௝ܿ 250 ݍ௜௝ 105-130 
௜݃௞ 1 ߬௜௝ 10 
ߤ௜௝ᇱᇱ 3 ߚ௜௝ 5
݊௜௝ 1 ߛ௜௝ 4
A PC with An Intel(R) Core TM i7-3770 3.4 GHz 
processor and 8GB memory is used for the computation. The 
program is coded by GAMS and solved by BOMININ (Basic 
Open-source Nonlinear Mixed Integer programming). The 
optimal solutions for the manufacturer are shown in Table 1. 
It takes 0.031 seconds to solve the average case problem, and 
0.016 seconds to solve the worst case problem. The absolute 
gap of this example is 7.275958e-012, and the relative gap is 
almost zero. A near-optimal solution can be derived by the 
proposed method. The results in Table 2 show that supplier 2 
and supplier 3 are selected for both of the average case and 
worst case. The prices of components offered by supplier 1 
are the most expensive. Moreover, the production capacity is 
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considered in the model. The purchasing quantity of 
components cannot exceed the capacity. Thus, the 
manufacturer will choose the cheaper one. Comparing with 
the results for the average case, the profit for the manufacturer 
decreases for the worst case. Meanwhile, the order quantity of 
components and estimated defective components increase for 
the worst case. The reason is that the manufacturer estimates 
that the quantity of defective components for the worst case is 
more than the quantity for the average case in order to avoid 
the huge loss. Thus, the required quantity of components also 
climbs up for the worst case. From the computational results, 
we conclude that it is necessary to optimize demand and 
quantity simultaneously for decision makers to obtain the 
maximum profits. 
Table 2. Optimal solution. 
Average case  Product 1   Product 2 
production  ʹͷǤ͹ͷͲ       ͳͺǤͲͲͲ
  Comp1  Comp2   Comp3  Comp4
order quantity of 
components 
sup1: െ        െ         െ              െ
 sup2: ͸ͺǤ͵ͻͷ ͹ʹǤͷͷͺ ͹͸Ǥ͹ʹʹ ͹͸Ǥ͹ʹʹ
 sup3: ͹͸Ǥ͹ʹʹ ͹͸Ǥ͹ʹʹ ͺͷǤͲͷͲ ͸ͺǤ͵ͻͷ
estimated defective 
components 
sup1: െ        െ          െ              െ
 sup2: ͵ǤͲͲͲ ͵ǤͲͲͲ      ͵ǤͲͲͲ        ͵ǤͲͲͲ
 sup3: ͵ǤͲͲͲ ͵ǤͲͲͲ      ͵Ǥʹʹ͹        ͵ǤͲͲͲ
profit  ͷ͵͹͵ͳǤ͵͵ͷ
Worst case  Product 1   Product 2 
production  ʹͷǤ͹ͷͲ       ͳͺǤͲͲͲ
  Comp1  Comp2   Comp3  Comp4
order quantity of 
components 
sup1: െ        െ         െ              െ
 sup2: ͸ͺǤ͵͵͵ ͹ʹǤͷͲͲ ͹͸Ǥ͸͸͹ ͹͸Ǥ͸͸͹
 sup3: ͹͸Ǥ͹ʹʹ ͹͸Ǥ͹ʹʹ ͺͷǤͲͷͲ ͸ͺǤ͵ͻͷ
estimated defective 
components 
sup1: െ        െ         െ              െ
 sup2: ͵Ǥ͵͸͹ ͵Ǥ͵ͷ͸      ͵Ǥ͵Ͷ͸        ͵Ǥ͵Ͷ͸
 sup3: ͵Ǥ͵Ͷ͸ ͵Ǥ͵Ͷ͸      ͵Ǥ͵ʹͻ        ͵Ǥ͵͸͹
profit  ͷͳ͸ͺ͸Ǥʹͺʹ
In this study, the demand of finished products is uncertain. 
In order to demonstrate the impact of demand uncertainty on 
profit for the average case and worst case, the comparative 
experiments are conducted by analyzing the deviation of 
demand of finished products. The results of sensitivity 
analysis are given in Table 3. The results show that the profits 
for both of the average case and the worst case always 
increase if the deviation is decreased. It indicates that if the 
demand from the market becomes stable, the manufacturer 
could obtain more profits.  
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis of demand deviation. 
Case 1 
Deviation
Product 1= 19    Product 2= 18 
Average case (profit) ͷ͵͹͵ͳǤ͵͵ͷ
Worst case (profit) ͷͳ͸ͺ͸Ǥʹͺʹ
Case 2 
Deviation
Product 1= 18    Product 2= 18 
Average case (profit) ͷ͸ͳͻͲǤͶͶ͵
Worst case (profit) ͷͳ͹͵ͻǤ͸͹Ͷ
Case 3 
Deviation
Product 1= 16    Product 2= 18 
Average case (profit) ͷ͸ͺʹͶǤͷͻͺ
Worst case (profit) ͷ͸͹ͻ͹Ǥ͸͵ͺ
5. Conclusion 
A three-echelon supply chain optimization model under 
demand uncertainty with asymmetric quality information is 
addressed. The manufacturer faces supplier selection and 
uncertain quality information. The problem is approached by 
non-cooperative game. The quality information between the 
manufacturer and suppliers is asymmetric. Two scenarios 
( average case and worst case ) for the manufacturer to 
estimate quality are studied. In future, more sophisticated 
estimation technique will be investigated.  
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